This should be the last part! I should really resist the temptation of wanting to continue from the previous day’s post! Well, I’m continuing from my last post.
Did some subtle changes in the quality of the playing field of the insurgency ‘sector’ occur in the meantime?
Did these changes in the quality of the playing field bring about the 180 degrees reversal in what the Naga perceived to be their ‘national interest’?
To my mind, the answer is ‘yes’.
Well, I’ll take this risk of appearing to praise the working of some Imphal-valley based rebel groups and speak out loudly.
This is the first time in the history of the Indian nation that some rebel groups’ political activities make a discernible impact on its foreign policy. This impact is presently making ripple effects in the nation-to-nation relations with India with several of its neighbours. Most of its neighbours are re-designing the diplomatic ‘ammunitions’ to be aimed towards India.
The most visible case is Burma India relations. Suddenly India seems to be obsessed with attempting to leaf frog to a cozy diplomatic relations with that country. Rangoon was bombarded with the sudden official visits of all the heavyweights of the Indian political establishment. Not to be outdone, top military officials were making secret trips to Rangoon. They are also supplying military hardware to the military junta there defying the will the International Community and discarding its much vaunted moral high grounds. They are also giving technical and training support to the junta. All these Indian efforts don’t seem to produce any perceptible dent in the Burmese government’s stance.
Unlike Bangladesh, the Burmese has no history of wanting to spite the Indians without any particular reason. Much more than impressed with the Indian handouts, Burmese leaderships are quick to come to grips with the previously unseen vulnerability of the Indian nationhood.
This is the same case with that of Chinese leadership. I think they are not much bothered with what’s happening in Burma despite the fact that the Burmese seem to have a lot of unexplored oil fields. Neither do they want to annex Arunachal Pradesh. Why should they suddenly make an issue of an Arunachali IAS probationer visiting Beijing? We have to remember here that they refused visa to the Arunachali because they were claiming that Arunachal Pradesh was a disputed area resulting in the whole of the IAS probationers, of which the Arunachali was a member, canceling their goodwill trip to Beijing. To my mind, we are all seeing these things because the Chinese leadership are quick to sense a possible vulnerability of the Indian nationhood and nimble enough to hastily act on it when presented with the first opportunity.
We know that even without all these diplomatic buildups in the region, the US will anyway give access to the nuclear supplies to India. They perceived that tying down the Chinese with an Indian ‘problem’ is in their national interest. So, making India stronger to ‘an acceptable level’ is the aim of US foreign policy. In this scenario, there is no possibility that they are not factoring in the political activities of the Manipur rebel groups in their diplomatic moves in the region.
Coming to the local, is it in the Naga’s( or the Kukis’s) ‘national interest’ to tie down the Imphal valley based rebel groups with ‘a boundary problem’?
If we try to answer this question, it is easy to see that the demand for the integration of Naga ( or Kuki) dominated areas into a single administrative set up is now not a simple thing od re-demarcating some boundary lines amongst the neighbouring states.
NOW, it carries a wider meaning.
Friday, August 31, 2007
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